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You often hear economists and investors talk thesedays about the ‘broken growth model’ in emergingmarkets. It isn’t a terribly precise term but it’s easy to see what people mean. The problem inEM is that none of the three possible sources of GDP growth – exports, or public domesticspending, or private domestic spending – have much going for them.
如今你经常听到经济学家和投资者谈论新兴市场“增长模式破产”。这不是一个特别准确的术语,但我们不难看出人们所指的意思。新兴市场的问题在于,国内生产总值(GDP)的三个可能增长源头——出口、公共国内支出和私人国内消费——没有一个是强劲的。
Exports from EM are hobbled by a collapse in the growth of global trade and the related fall inworld commodity prices. Public spending growth is weak because many governments are toonervous to loosen fiscal policy, fearing a loss of sovereign creditworthiness at a time when theoutlook for capital inflows isn’t encouraging. And private domestic spending is hampered bythe fact that credit markets in many countries are in ‘post-boom’ mode: neither domesticlenders nor borrowers have much in the way of risk appetite.
全球贸易增速剧减以及相关的世界大宗商品价格下跌,重创了新兴市场的出口。公共支出增长很弱,原因在于许多政府过于紧张、不敢放松财政政策,担心在资本流入前景不妙之际丧失主权信誉。私人国内消费受到了许多国家的信贷市场处于‘后繁荣’状态的抑制咨询QQ、微信:2544906债务数量,积累外汇储备,从总体上延长政府债券的年期。的确,在本世纪头10年里,主权资产负债表的健康状况大为好转:新兴市场的平均债务/GDP比率从21世纪初的60%以上,降低到如今的略高于40%。
That felt like enough, since the 2000s wrapped these countries in the warm embrace of rapidChinese growth, plenty of external financing, and unusually strong import growth in thedeveloped world. So, structural reform was crowded out by an intellectual emphasis on thecentral importance of balance sheets, aided by an exceptionally friendly world economy thatmade EM policymakers feel that whatever it was they were doing, it was working.
这给人的感觉是足够了,因为在本世纪头10年里,这些国家极大地受益于中国快速增长、充足外部资金和异常强劲的发达世界进口增长。结构性改革被排挤掉了,因为学术界强调资产负债表的核心重要性,而极其有利的世界经济促使新兴市场的政策制定者觉得,无论他们在做什么,他们的行动都很灵验。
Now that the global economic temperature is much colder, what we’re learning is that having astrong sovereign balance sheet is at best a necessary – but not a sufficient – condition forenjoying stable growth. A business climate that supports animal spirits is needed too, more sotoday than any time in the recent past.
现在既然全球经济温度低了很多,我们学到的教益是,拥有强大的主权资产负债表充其量是享有稳定增长的必要条件,而不是充分条件。还需要一种支持“动物精神”的商业氛围,与近年任何时候相比,如今更是如此。
But it takes time for countries to reach that conclusion. Look at Mexico, for example. Onereason that Mexicans ended up electing a President in 2012 who was committed to properstructural reform – in energy, telecoms, education and labour above all – was that its economicperformance had been dismal for over 30 years.
但各国需要一定的时间才能得出这个结论。以墨西哥为例。2012年,墨西哥人选出了一位承诺认真推行结构性改革(最重要的是能源、电信、教育以及劳动力市场改革)的总统,原因之一在于,该国的经济表现令人沮丧已有30余年了。
The 1980s were ‘lost’ as a result of a debt crisis; the 1990s were overshadowed by China’s1993 devaluation and the subsequent Tequila crisis in late 1994; and in the 2000s Mexico wasone of the few countries in the developing world that failed to benefit from China’s rise, sinceChina’s membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 allowed its exporters tocapture market share from, above all, Mexico. Between 1980 and 2010, emerging economiesas a whole enjoyed GDP growth of 4.5 per cent on average. Mexico rubbed along with just 2.6per cent. And it was this persistently weak economic performance which gave the countryplenty of time to come up with a diagnosis, and elect a President aiming to do something aboutit (not that his effort has been an unqualified success).
一场债务危机使墨西哥“失去了”上世纪80年代;90年代,墨西哥受到1993年中国人民币贬值和1994年末特基拉危机的影响;本世纪头10年,墨西哥是未能受益于中国崛起的少数发展中国家之一,因为2001年中国加入世贸组织(WTO)使得中国出口商从其他国家那里夺取了市场份额,首当其冲的便是墨西哥。1980年至2010年间,新兴经济体整体的平均GDP增速达到4.5%。墨西哥则只有2.6%。正是这种持续疲弱的经济表现,让墨西哥举国上下有很多时间得出诊断结果,最终选举出一位有意采取相应行动的总统(当然他的努力也并未取得绝对成功)。
Let’s hope that it doesn’t take too many countries a generation to discover the need forstructural reforms, or the ‘growth model’ may stay broken for a depressingly long time.
我们希望,不要有太多的国家需要一代人的时间才能发现结构性改革的必要性,否则的话,当前“增长模式”或许会失灵很久。
But here’s a dilemma. One of the gravest structural deficiencies in EM is poor infrastructure.Yet improving this will almost certainly require funding from the public sector. So countries mayfind themselves with a difficult choice: is it better to maintain as strong a public balance sheet aspossible in order to keep your country’s borrowing costs low? Or is it worth tolerating higherpublic debt levels in order to finance infrastructure? The outlook for EM growth would be a lotmore rosy if there was an easy answer to that question.
但这里有个两难。新兴市场的最严重结构性缺陷之一是基础设施薄弱。但是,改善基础设施将几乎肯定需要公共部门资金。所以,这些国家或许会发现自己面临一个棘手选择:维持尽可能强大的公共部门资产负债表、以便把国家的借款成本保持在低水平?还是忍受更高的公共债务水平、以便为完善基础设施提供资金支持?如果这个问题有轻松的答案,新兴市场增长的前景就将美好得多。 |
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